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Tracing Fault Effects in FPGA Systems
Mariusz We˛grzyn and Janusz Sosnowski
Abstract—The paper presents the extent of fault effects in
FPGA based systems and concentrates on transient faults (in-
duced by single event upsets – SEUs) within the configuration
memory of FPGA. An original method of detailed analysis of fault
effect propagation is presented. It is targeted at microprocessor
based FPGA systems using the developed fault injection tech-
nique. The fault injection is performed at HDL description level
of the microprocessor using special simulators and developed
supplementary programs. The proposed methodology is illus-
trated for soft PicoBlaze microprocessor running 3 programs.
The presented results reveal some problems with fault handling
at the software level.
Keywords—FPGA testing, application based testing, fault in-
jection, SEUs
I. INTRODUCTION
FPGA based systems become very popular in many tech-nical domains, including dependable applications where
fault effects may have critical consequences. Hence, various
fault tolerance schemes are proposed in the literature, e.g.
partial reconfiguration, massive redundancy, error scrubbing
[1]–[3]. As opposed to classical systems based on ASICs and
microprocessors (with fixed logical structure) in FPGAs we
face some additional problems related to configuration faults
which have severe impact on the system operation. Developing
fault detection and fault tolerance techniques we have to
analyze propagation of fault effects taking into account the
specificity of FPGA structures. A special interest is targeted
at transient faults, due to the fact that permanent faults result
in similar effects as in classical fixed logic systems. Transient
faults relate to SEUs (single event upsets) caused by cosmic
radiation, electromagnetic disturbances, power problems, etc.
In the literature we observe a strong interest to analyze
transient fault impact on FPGAs exposed to radiation (e.g.
[4]–[7]). These experiments confirm critical effects at the level
of implemented application within FPGAs. Unfortunately, the
controllability and observability of these experiments is low.
They give only some general view of the problem.
The drawbacks of radiation experiments can be alleviated
in simulation based fault injections. For this purpose we have
developed fault injection scenarios at HDL level. We have
concentrated on SEUs within FPGA configuration memory,
due to the fact that related faults may have significant impact
on the system operation, however the analysis of their effects
is still neglected. Moreover, we concentrate on investigating
these effects in correlation with implemented applications. An
important and original contribution of this paper is tracing
fault effects related to three levels: logical, microprocessor
and application. We take into account microprocessor model
PicoBlaze which is used to run various programs. This is quite
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typical model of using FPGAs in many systems (e.g. [3], [8],
[9]), however in practice we can use more sophisticated micro-
processors e.g. Power PC [8] (for many of them configuration
files for FPGAs are available).
Various fault handling techniques have been developed for
classical fixed logic microprocessor systems ( [10], [11] and
references therein). We have found that using them directly in
FPGA based microprocessor systems is not so efficient as in
classical fixed logic and some supplementary techniques have
to be added. We deal with this problem in the paper. Another
important issue in fault handling is testing the hardware
platform. FPGAs create here more problems than fixed logic
systems. This results from functional block universality and
a wide scope of configurations. So, complete testing of the
available logical and interconnection resources is cumbersome,
it involves several chip reconfigurations (high time overhead)
including programming various BIST schemes (compare [12]–
[14]). In practice, we are restricted to a single application
implemented on FPGA. Hence, application based testing can
be a reasonable solution [9], [15]–[17]. Checking the effec-
tiveness of such tests we can use fault injection techniques.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives some
general view on fault models and fault injection techniques in
FPGAs. Section 3 describes the developed fault injection envi-
ronment and test scenarios. Experimental results are presented
in section 4. Final conclusions are given in section 5.
II. FAULTS IN FPGAS
SRAM based FPGAs are composed of configurable logic
blocks (CLBs), routing circuitry which connects these blocks
and configuration memory which defines performed functions
of CLBs and their interconnections (performed by switch
boxes and wiring segments). Typically, CLBs comprise some
look up tables, flip-flops and internal routing (e.g. implemented
with multiplexers controlled by the configuration memory).
Look up tables (LUTs) define logical functions (truth table)
of n inputs and m outputs. Sometimes special data RAM mem-
ories and specialized logical blocks (e.g. arithmetic logic) are
included also. The functionality of FPGA is determined by the
configuration memory, its content is programmed externally
by loading appropriate stream of bits. This stream usually is
organized in frames (e.g. 32 bits in Virtex 4). Frames can be
attributed to CLBs, and other programmable components in
FPGA (e.g. switches).
In general, we can distinguish permanent and transient
faults. Permanent faults result from physical damages such
as stuck at faults caused by shorts, opens of connections to
inputs or outputs of logic circuits, etc. Transient faults relate
to temporary disturbances which change the state of logical
components (e.g. flip-flop state change, gate input or output
pulse glitch, RAM cell state change). These disturbances
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can result from electromagnetic interference, power supply
noise, cosmic, artificial and natural radiation (e.g. due to
alpha particles which are emitted by radiating impurities in
the chip packaging materials). There are also intermittent
faults which have the nature of reoccurring transient faults
of short or long duration. In fact, they relate to physical
damages of more subtle nature, e.g. degradation of some
electrical parameters (revealing as logical faults under specific
operational circumstances), crosstalk, etc. Dealing with per-
manent and intermittent faults in FPGAs practically is very
similar to classical fixed logic circuitry [10], [11]. Similarly
we can treat transient faults related to fixed logic components
of FPGAs (e.g. CLBs, data RAMs). The most critical are
transient faults within the configuration memory. These faults
may change the function of FPGA blocks and connections. As
opposed to fixed logic systems many transient fault mitigation
techniques, e.g. based on time or software redundancy are
not effective in the case of configuration faults. FPGAs are
becoming more prone to transient faults due to the increasing
integration density [5], [6]. In most cases they are modeled
as single event upsets. They are more probable in space and
avionics systems exposed to higher level of cosmic radiation,
nevertheless neutron particles present in the atmosphere can
also produce SEUs.
In practice, an important issue is transient fault risk assess-
ment in relevance to configuration memory. For this purpose
various experiments have been performed with artificial and
natural radiation. These experiments have low controllability
and observability, which is important to get a deeper view on
SEUs consequences. Moreover, in practice we deal with FPGA
based systems performing a preprogrammed function (appli-
cation), so it is reasonable to analyze fault effects concerning
this application. Hence, we have developed a test bench for
experiments with fault injection at hardware description level.
In general, FPGA susceptibility to SEUs can be evaluated in
four ways:
1) Exposing a large number of FPGA circuits to cosmic
rays at specified conditions on the earth for a long
time. This approach has been used in Rosetta experi-
ment [4] which assured total testing time in the range
from hundred thousand to millions device hours. FPGA
configuration bit streams were continuously checked by
read out operations (compared with the reference stored
patterns). In this way average failure rates have been
derived for 4200 m above sea level and 550 meters
below ground.
2) Exposing FPGAs to an accelerated neutron flux. Special
expensive equipment is needed here [6], [7], it assures
also specification of particle energies and intensity.
Knowing the space radiation energies and intensity on
the earth or satellite orbits (for different places and alti-
tudes) we can recalculate the operation time in the exper-
iment (with the accelerator) to the equivalent time in the
considered FPGA operation target environment, e.g. [3].
3) Fault emulation in FPGAs. Faults can be emulated
by disturbing configuration bit streams and loading
them through the configuration interface (e.g. JTAG)
to the tested chip and monitoring its behavior. Here,
some supporting equipment is needed (compare [3], [8],
[18]). This can be extended for flip-flops and block
RAMs in more sophisticated fault injectors. In [19]
a more complex fault emulation scheme is integrated
with the modified VHDL source code (additional gates,
multiplexers, wires, etc.) of the analyzed system, this
approach is not useful for the planned experiments with
SEUs in LUTs.
4) Fault injections into FPGA simulators – this approach
has been used in our experiments (section 3).
The first approach gives some general characterization of
FPGA susceptibility to SEUs, which can be a basis of some
scaling adapted to the considered implemented systems (e.g.
taking into account resource usage). Typically, SEU error rate
is specified in FIT units (the number of failures that can occur
in 109 hours) referred to the memory size in bits. In [3], [4],
[20] we have quite interesting results related to radiation at the
level of the earth. They cover not only susceptibility of con-
figuration memory to SEUs but also data RAMs incorporated
in logical units (block RAM memory). Depending upon the
technology (150nm to 65 nm in Virtex5) failure rate for config-
uration memory was in the range 401-151 FIT/Mbs (with 95%
confidence intervals: [367,435]-[101,215]), it decreased with
higher integration densities (however, higher dispersion was
observed over the tested chips here) due to additional new fault
hardening techniques used in these memories. In the case of
data RAM block failure rate was in the range 397-635 FIT/Mb
(with 95% confidence intervals: [317,491]-[428-907]) and it
increased with the integration density. The Rosetta experiment
[4] confirmed that most probable are single bit changes,
multi bit upsets were negligible. Configuration memory is
less susceptible to SEUs than data memory. Moreover, the
susceptibility of flip-flops in CLBs was very low (for Virtex5
approximately 0.06 FIT/Mb). The presented results explain
why in newly developed FPGAs we can encounter ECC codes
combined with configuration frames.
We should be conscious that the probability of SEUs
increases with the altitudes above the sea level, hence it can
be several times higher in the mountains, for airplane flights
the increase can be several hundred times higher, in the space
environment (satellites and other cosmic equipment) this can
be even higher [3]. Moreover, in these cases multi bit upsets
are also more probable.
Experiments of the second type allow us to characterize fault
susceptibility of real applications. In practice, implementing
some application (circuit) over FPGA we do not use all
chip resources, moreover in this case many configuration bits
do not effect this implementation. Hence, the derived fault
susceptibility in experiments of type 2 have to be scaled down
taking into account radiation characteristics of the operational
environment. However, experiments of type 2 can be per-
formed in short time using a single or a few FPGA chips.
This is critical taking into account a wide scope of possible
application’s and implementations.
Experiments of type 3 are more flexible and cheaper, they
can be performed in short time with single FPGA, moreover
the required test environment can be relatively cheap. How-
ever, it is targeted at checking fault susceptibility in relevance
to artificially injected SEUs, so the equivalent fault rate in
FITs needs to be recalculated taking into account overall
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SEUs susceptibility of FPGAs (obtained from the first group
of experiments). For this purpose we can use the following
formula to scale the results:
FSA = FSFPGA ∗ CUA ∗NFSA
where FSA and FSFPGA are fault rates in FITs related to
the considered preprogrammed application and overall FPGA
structure (we consider here only configuration memory bits),
CUA is configuration memory usage ratio for the implemented
application, NFSA is natural fault masking of the application
(e.g. algorithm fault tolerance, partial redundancy). CUA re-
lates to the limited usage of logical blocks and potentially
critical configuration bits for the application (compare [3]).
For Virtex 5 (xc5v1x50t) the nominal fault rate is 151 FIT/Mb
and the configuration memory is 11.37 Mb, hence for this chip
FSFPGA = 1717 FIT, which is equivalent to about 66 years
of Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). FISA relates to
natural fault tolerance of the application. In [3] an application
with dual microprocessors (PicoBlaze) has been considered
which used 82% of chip logical resources and the estimated
critical configuration bits resulted in CUA = 16%. Fault
injection experiment (over 5000 faults injected randomly in
configuration bits) resulted in 4.9% failures, hence FSA = 84
FIT (NFSA was about 30%). Using an error recovery technique
(based on an additional PicoBlaze processor) FSA has been
reduced to 20 FIT [3].
In experiment 3 it is difficult to trace fault effects, moreover
correlation of configuration bits with used functional blocks
is quite complex, so significant number of fault injections
is needed even if the application uses only a small part
of the chip. Deeper fault propagation analysis is useful to
optimize fault mitigation mechanisms. This can be achieved
in experiment 4. Here we can disturb only used resources.
However, a good simulator is needed (e.g. Cadance).
In the literature various error detection, error recovery and
fault tolerance techniques have been proposed for FPGA based
systems. The most complex ones use massive redundancy
e.g. triple modular redundancy, which is very expensive and
acceptable in the case of critical applications ( [1], [3], [19]
and references). Targeting at configuration SEUs we can detect
faults by periodical read backs and if needed recoding config-
uration bit stream [21]. This results in high time overhead
unacceptable in many applications. Some FPGAs provide
the capability of partial reconfiguration, which can be used
to optimize this technique. Checking the correctness of the
configuration frames can be done by some external circuitry
or internally by built in checker in FPGA (e.g. based on
some simple microprocessor with self-testing capability). The
latter solution is possible in FPGAs which provide internal
configuration port and embedded ECC codes in the config-
uration frames stored on chip. This is available in Virtex
4 and 5 devices, where ECC code detects double errors,
locates single bit errors. This capabilities can be used to
mitigate SEUs (compare [3], where FSA has been reduced
from 84 FIT to 20 FIT).
In classical fixed logic microprocessor based systems var-
ious software techniques can be used to mitigate SEUs
(e.g. recalculation, checksums, exception handling, software
redundancy [10]). Recently, many applications implemented
in FPGAs are based on embedded (programmed in FPGA)
microprocessors. Hence, arises the problem of checking their
fault robustness in FPGA, as well as checking the effectiveness
of software tests for microprocessors [9]. These techniques can
be targeted at the considered applications to make them more
effective and cheaper. The robustness of these solutions can
be checked in experiments of type 4. In particular, they allow
us to achieve high degree of stressing the tested application
as compared with other experiments.
III. TESTING SCHEMES
The developed experiments are targeted at testing fault
susceptibility of application programs running on a micro-
processor implemented within FPGA. The general idea is to
use appropriate microprocessor simulator which accepts its
specification in HDL language, correlates it with the targeted
FPGA, performs simulations of executing provided programs
(in assembler) and allows analyzing the behavior of the tested
application (e.g. program results) in this environment. These
assumptions are fulfilled by two simulators: Cadence NC
VHDL and Mentor Graphics ModelSim. Fault injection is
performed at microprocessor HDL description level, which
reflects FPGA implementation.
There are available HDL descriptions of soft processors
for FPGA implementation, e.g. PicoBlaze for Xilinx FPGAs
[22]. Their HDL descriptions reflect the FPGA structure in
order to efficiently use the FPGA resources that allow precise
modeling of the faults and their automated fault injection. Each
simulated fault is represented by an appropriate HDL file,
however some additional scripts are needed to perform fault
injection campaigns and analyze their effects in an automatic
way. The faults in an HDL description of the processor are
simulated by modifying the individual functional blocks. For
each functional block a HDL model describing behavior of
SEU-induced faults is developed. The HDL model should
actually reflect the change of configuration as a consequence
of the SEU effect.
In the performed experiments we use PicoBlaze processor
specified in VHDL [22]. The basic VHDL entities (Xilinx
basic primitive subcircuits) in Xilinx PicoBlaze processor core
description are: RAMs, LUTs, multiplexers and flip-flops.
RAM and flip-flop state changes are of a transient nature and
can be modified (i.e. restored to a fault-free value) during
normal system operation. These faults are detected with an
online functional test, specific to the target application and
hence they are not the subject of this investigation. Our goal
is to analyze fault effects in the configuration of the processor
core (in particular, faults in LUTs).
The generation of the fault descriptions was implemented
as a perl script. All the instances of LUTs related to functional
blocks are located (specified) in the VHDL description of
the processor core. For each LUT instance its initialization
parameter is investigated and the list of the initialization
parameters describing all the SEU-induced faults as well as all
the stuck-at faults at the LUT inputs and outputs are generated.
For some LUT instances it is possible that a single bit change
of a LUT content manifests itself as a stuck-at fault. In such
a case a duplicated stuck-at fault description is excluded. In
a similar way the stuck-at faults at the LUT inputs as well as
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a)
move_group_LUT: LUT4
generic map (INIT => X"7400")
port map( I0 => instruction(14),
I1 => instruction(15),
I2 => instruction(16),
I3 => instruction(17),
O => move_group );
b)
Inputs INIT => X"7400" INIT => X"7480"
I2 I1 I0 O(I3=0) O(I3=1) O(I3=0) O(I3=1)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Fig. 1. Fault effect related to the change of one bit (X"7400" → X"7480")
in LUT4: a) VHDL description of fault-free four-input circuit, b) truth tables
for fault free and faulty LUT.
the stuck-at faults at the LUT output can also be modeled by
modifying the contents of the LUT configuration.
An example of a modeled fault is shown in Fig. 1. The
VHDL description of a LUT implementing a circuit generating
an internal processor signal move-group is shown in Fig. 1a
and the corresponding truth table in Fig. 1b. The input signals
I0-I3 relate to the specified bits (in brackets) of the instruction
code (in the instruction register). The implemented logic func-
tion is defined by the initialization parameter (INIT) assumed
as X"7400", i.e. hexadecimal code related to a vector compris-
ing bits of concatenated columns O(I3=1) and O(I3=0). The
most significant bits of O(I3=1) and O(I3=0) bytes relate to
the last row of the table. The SEU-induced fault of a LUT
typically manifests itself as a change of one bit of the LUT,
thus modifying the Boolean function it implements. Let us
assume that the 8th bit of the LUT column O(I3=0) has been
changed (truth table in Fig. 1b with marked false value as bold
underlined 1). This fault can be modeled in VHDL description
changing the initialization parameter (INIT) from X"7400" to
X"7480". Similarly, we can model stuck-at faults on inputs
or outputs. For example a stuck-at-1 fault at input I3 in the
considered LUT is modeled by INIT = X"7474", i.e. column
O(I3=0) assumes the value of column O(I3=1). Stuck-at-1 fault
at output O is modelled by INIT = X"FFFF" (all LUT memory
entries equal to 1).
The considered LUT (LUT4 in VHDL description [22]) in
Fig. 1a relates to the decoder for the control of the program
counter and CALL/RETURN stack. Having analyzed the effect
of the simulated fault (INIT = X"7480") we have found that it
resulted in erroneous decoding of SUB or SUBCY instructions
as RETURN or JUMP with unknown address locations, so the
program did not terminate correctly.
During the fault simulation the generated “faulty” initializa-
tion parameters were applied one by one to the VHDL descrip-
tion of the Xilinx PicoBlaze processor core [22]. A modified
VHDL description is then used by the simulator to run a tested
application (program). Taking into account a large number of
considered faults we use special scripts which automatize the
processes of loading new configuration, running the applica-
tion and storing results. Having injected the specified number
of fault injections we check the results with an additional
script which qualifies fault effects and generates summarized
statistics. It is also possible to trace effects of individual faults
even at the signal levels within selected internal logic circuits,
e.g. an output of some flip-flop. For PicoBlaze processor we
have identified 1804 single bit faults related to used LUTs. The
Xilinx PicoBlaze processor is a small 8-bit microprocessor,
used mainly for training purposes. It has 1K of program space,
16 8-bit registers, 256 input and 256 output ports, a 64-byte
internal scratchpad RAM and a 31-location stack. The original
VHDL description of the processor core consists of about 1500
lines of code.
We needed to modify the original VHDL description to
enable the perl script fault injection. The PicoBlaze hardware
is generated using VHDL loops “for” which create more
instances of the same sub-circuits (most loops replicate 8 times
bit slices of some logical blocks). To make accessible all these
instances to the fault injector, we have “unrolled” all “for”
loops (explicit code blocks embedded in VHDL description).
The unrolled VHDL description results in about 3000 lines of
code. In this way the perl script has direct access to every line
of the hardware description. The fault injection is implemented
by reading line by line this unrolled VHDL description by the
perl script. The script looks for proper strings (description of
INIT parameters) in the code and then changes values of these
parameters. After every change was completed, simulation is
started by the same script.
In the VHDL description we can distinguish 14 modules,
we give functions of these modules, related VHDL description
lines (beyond these lines there are some initialization, com-
ment and control lines) and the number of functional FPGA
elements used in these modules (CLB – logical blocks, LUT
– configuration tables, FF – flip-flops, MUX – multiplexers
and XOR circuits). The presented parameters give some view
on the PicoBlaze microprocessor complexity:
• Basic control unit (lines 305-326); CLB = 1, LUT = 1,
FF = 3
• Interrupt logic (lines 343 to 392); CLB = 2, LUT = 3,
FF = 6
• Decoder for the control of the program counter and
CALL/RETURN stack circuitry (lines 414 to 463);
CLB = 3
• The ZERO and CARRY flags circuitry (lines 479 to 625);
CLB = 6, LUT = 11, FF = 3, MUX = 8, XOR = 3
• The program counter (lines 693 to 944); CLB = 10,
LUT = 20, FF = 10, MUX = 20, XOR = 29
• Register bank and the second operand selection (lines
1208 to 1467); CLB = 5, LUT = 10, FF = 1
• Memory storing function (lines 1493 to 1508); CLB = 5,
LUT = 2, FF = 10
• Logical operations combined with the pipeline stage to
form ALU multiplexer and decoding circuitry (lines 1713
to 1856); CLB = 5, LUT = 9, FF = 8
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• Shift and Rotate operations combined with the pipeline
stage (lines 1888 to 2079); CLB = 6, LUT = 11, FF = 9,
MUX = 1
• Arithmetic operations combined with the pipeline stage
(lines 2107 to 2339); CLB = 5, LUT = 9, FF = 8,
MUX = 8, XOR = 8
• Generation of the most significant bit in ALU (lines
2376 to 2396); this function is implemented within the
presented above 3 functional modules related to ALU
• ALU multiplexer (Lines 2418 to 2641); CLB = 9,
LUT = 17, FF = 1, MUX = 1, XOR = 8
• Read and Write strobes (lines 2674 to 2691); CLB = 2,
LUT = 3, FF = 2
• CALL/RETURN stack control (lines 2964 to 3075);
CLB = 6, LUT = 5, FF = 11, MUX = 4, XOR = 5
We have found the need of checking FPGA fault susceptibil-
ity at the application level, which runs on the preprogrammed
processor soft core PicoBlaze. Here, we have to take into ac-
count the fact that the processor resources can be used partially
or in a limited way. Moreover, in this case we may encounter
natural fault masking capability of the application as well as
we can introduce some additional fault tolerance mechanisms
at the software level (compare [10]). For this purpose we have
developed 3 matrix multiplication programs (MM1-MM3).
The basic program MM1 comprises 133 instructions, only 16
different instructions from the PicoBlaze instruction set are
used. The static distribution of the used instructions was as
follows (instruction occurrences in the program are shown in
brackets):
ADD(40), CALL(1), COMPARE(8), FETCH(3),
JUMP[C,NC,Z,NZ](20), RETURN(1), SRA(2), SR0(1),
STORE[kk,(sY)](53), SUB(4), TEST(1).
Program MM2 is an enhanced version of MM1 by adding
control sums in columns and rows of the first and second argu-
ment matrix, respectively. This assures control sums (columns
and rows) in the resulting matrix. MM2 program comprises
226 assembler instructions, using 17 instruction codes from
the processor list with the following distribution:
ADD(53), ADDCY(2), CALL(1), COMPARE(21),
FETCH(16), JUMP[C,NC,Z,NZ](46), RETURN(2), SRA(2),
SR0(1), STORE[kk,(sY)](78), SUB(5), TEST(1).
Program MM3 is an enhanced version of MM2 by adding
exception handling. It comprises 386 instructions, using 21
instruction codes from the processor list with the following
distribution:
ADD(59), ADDCY(4), AND, CALL(1), COMPARE(23),
FETCH(17), JUMP[C,NC,Z,NZ](53), RETURN(2), SRA(2),
SR0(1), STORE[kk,(sY)](85), SUB(5), TEST(2).
The mnemonics of instructions are self-explanatory (com-
pare [22]), please note that JUMP and STORE relate to 4
(different condition tags) and 2 (memory address immediate
or in a register) types of instructions, respectively.
In the performed experiments configuration faults have been
injected at VHDL description level and for each fault the
analyzed program has been executed in the simulator. Fault
impact has been checked at the application level. For this
purpose we have developed a special script which compared
the resulting matrix with the reference correct one and checked
program termination. Fault effects are summarized in Tab. I.
TABLE I
FAULT INJECTION EFFECTS FOR MATRIX MULTIPLICATION.
Program Fault effects Number of
version No result Incorrect result Correct result new faults
MM1 28.62% 21.23% 50.16% 12
MM2 28.62% 21.22% 48.84% 13
MM3 33.11% 19.94% 53.05% 13
We have distinguished 3 classes of fault effects: no result – the
program does not terminate (infinite loop) or does not produce
the resulting matrix, incorrect result – the generated result is
erroneous (typically many result matrix entries are incorrect),
correct result – many injected faults disturb operation of
microprocessor logic blocks which are not used during the
program execution (e.g. related to not used instructions). The
input data for the tested applications assures 100% coverage
of executed instructions in the program.
In [9] the first author checked fault effect propagation for
the developed self-test program of PicoBlaze microprocessor.
This test used up to 256 test vectors and covered over 90%
of injected faults. Each test iteration (related to the specified
initial test vector) involved execution of about 300 processor
instructions. There were 41 hard to detect faults of the first
order, i.e. detected by only one test vector. It was interesting
that the matrix multiplication program allowed us to reveal
(detect) some additional faults (shown in the last column).
Tracing the propagation of these faults in these programs we
could identify the reasons of their masking in the self-test
program. Hence, it was possible to improve some instruction
sequences to cover these faults. We have also noticed that
the considered programs detected 16, 16 and 21 hard to
detect faults, respectively. An interesting issue was that these
3 programs detected almost the same new faults.
It was interesting to compare this with fault effects in the
developed program of matrix multiplication for the fixed logic
microprocessor (compatible with Intel x86) [10]. Here, we
have got more fault detections and corrections due to the
control sums. In particular incorrect results appeared only in
0-1% cases, depending upon fault injections (single bit-flips
in data, registers or program code). Correct results contributed
50-80% in the case of program handling exceptions. The
program handling only checksums assured 30-36% correct
results for faults injected into registers and data area (however
2.1% correct results appeared for faults injected into program
code). This relative high fault robustness (small percentage
of incorrect undetected results) did not appear in FPGA
based microprocessor, due to the fact that configuration faults
introduce more permanent disturbances as opposed to more
transient effects in fixed logic microprocessors. Moreover,
system exceptions in Intel x86 platform are more efficient
than in PicoBlaze. In the FPGA experiment incorrect result
matrices comprised many erroneous entries, quite often these
entries were repeated. Hence, corrections practically were not
possible.
Performing a similar experiment with a simpler application
(calculation of Fibonacci series – about 30 instructions) we
have found over 65% of correct results and no newly detected
fault as compared with the basic testing program.
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The performed experiments confirm that software tech-
niques used to detect or correct errors in fixed microprocessors
are not sufficient to deal with configuration faults in FPGA
based systems. They can mitigate fault effects beyond the
configuration memory, e.g. SEUs effects within data flow,
flip-flops. Hence, we have to use more expensive redundant
systems, doubled microprocessor with comparison [3], [8] or
check periodically the correctness of the configured system
either by a self-test procedure or checking configuration read
backs [3], [14]. Both approaches can be optimized to the
implemented application. Configuration read back can be per-
formed externally (comparison of the whole configuration file
with the reference one or checking its compacted signature)
which is time consuming. In the case of FPGAs with stored
ECC codes for each configuration frame a faster internal
checking can be performed, e.g. internally read back frames
are verified with ECC code checker. Adapting this approach to
the configured application is not trivial due to the difficulty of
localizing and selecting frames related to the used blocks. It
is also worth noting that even in the case of double modular
redundancy checking configuration bits is needed to restore
redundant structure after detection of the faulty processor.
In the opposite case the degraded simplex structure becomes
susceptible to the next fault. In critical applications we can use
more expensive flash based FPGAs, which can be considered
as SEUs resistant.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In many practical FPGA based systems we should use
SEU mitigation techniques, in particular, they should cover
configuration memory. This is a challenging problem in the
case of microprocessor based systems where SEU effects
from logical level propagate to microprocessor and applica-
tion level. Each of these levels can introduce various fault
barriers, moreover it comprises some natural fault robust-
ness, which is characteristic to the implemented application.
Hence, application oriented evaluation techniques are of great
importance in the case of FPGAs. This is assured in the
developed testing scheme. An interesting result is that some
classical software fault mitigation techniques used in fixed
logic microprocessor systems are not effective in FPGA based
systems. Hence, efficient reconfiguration combined with appli-
cation based microprocessor self-tests is of great importance.
Developing these tests we should also verify them in fault
injection experiments. This technique allowed us to identify
and correct some imperfections in the previously developed
(by the first author) PicoBlaze processor test used in [9]. In
critical problems flash configuration memories can be used.
Further research is targeted at checking various classes
of applications and improving microprocessor tests. We plan
to develop application based tests for programs with more
complex control flow. In particular, we can use here various
structural coverage metrics (compare [23]) to select represen-
tative input data. This can be also combined with structural
and pseudorandom testing schemes [23].
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